Use Cases/AI & Identity/AI Access Control
AI access control 01

Govern the AI your
people / and agents use.

See every AI app, agent and MCP server in use, decide what reaches the model and every tool call, and trace each action to the person behind it. All without replacing your identity provider, your AI clients or the gateways you run.

EXTHOOKGATEAPI
Visibility from day one.
Discovery and recording start in monitor mode. Blocking is switched on policy by policy, when the data says it's safe.
/ AI decision logenforcing
upload · Q3-forecast.xlsx dana.lee → claude-opus-5-5 · tagged Financeblock
github.create_pull_request alice → coding-agent · group engallow
deploy alice → ops-agent · production writes need sredeny
"summarize churned customers" intent read · customer data → token crm.readscoped
unapproved AI site [email protected] · browser sign-inwarn
1,284 decisions today12 blocked
The problem 02

AI already acts for your people. Security can't see it, stop it or trace it.

47%
of CISOs can identify every AI agent in their environment. Okta CISO Insights · Jul 2026
74%
say AI agents get more access than their task needs. CSA / Aembit · Mar 2026
68%
of organizations can't tell an AI agent's actions from a person's. CSA / Aembit · Mar 2026

You can't see it, you can't stop it in time, and you can't say who did it. People sign up for AI tools with corporate accounts, connect MCP servers and grant OAuth consents, and little of it shows up in the identity provider. A prompt carrying a confidential file, or a tool call that writes to production, has already happened by the time anyone reads a log. And that log shows the agent or a shared key, not the person it acted for. SlashID closes all three from one identity graph.

How it works 03

Four control points, one identity graph.

01
Browser extension

Where people use AI on the web

Sign-ins, sessions and OAuth consents on any site. Deny or warn on AI sites you haven't approved.

02
Model hooks

On every model call, server side

Before the model runs, block prompts by expression, intent or model, plus sensitive uploads and destructive tool calls.

03
Gate

In front of model APIs and MCP

Corporate sign-in, a decision on every model and tool call, and delegated tokens between agents and services.

04
Provider APIs

Inside the model providers

Users, keys, usage and conversations. Revoke keys and suspend users from the console.

Interaction Covered by What that means
Person → AI app ExtensionProvider APIs Sign-ins and consents discovered in the browser, deny or warn lists, and usage and conversations from the provider.
Prompt → model Model hooks Blocked on the prompt's expressions or intent, the model, or a sensitive file, for the account, a group or a person.
App → model API Gate Model calls blocked inline for any app or agent, with nothing installed on the client.
Agent → built-in tool Model hooks Shell commands and file edits never cross the network, so the model hook decides them.
Agent → MCP server GateModel hooks Corporate sign-in and a decision on every call at Gate; rules on the tool, or on whether it writes or deletes, in the model hook.
Agent → API or agent Gate as sidecar Delegated tokens that name the person and each agent, with a policy at every hop.
AI accounts and keys Provider APIs Users and API keys inventoried and tied to people; keys revoked and users suspended from the console.
See 04

Every AI app, agent and MCP server, tied to a person.

/The AI people bring themselves

The browser extension sees sign-ins and sessions on any AI site, the OAuth consents people grant and the browser extensions they install, all attributed to the person signed in.

/The AI the company pays for

Users, keys, agents, usage and conversations from the model providers, Bedrock, Azure OpenAI, Entra Agent ID and Slack, joined to the same people.

/What agents actually call

The models, tools and MCP servers in use, seen as each prompt and tool call goes through a model hook or Gate.

/An owner for every agent

Each agent and key is tied to its owner or sponsor. Orphaned, dormant and never-expiring ones are flagged, including when the owner leaves. See what each one can reach on the graph, and find over-privileged agents before they're misused.

/Keys and roles resolve to people

Bedrock calls are followed through assumed roles to the SSO user, keys resolve to their owner, and human sessions are told apart from automation.

/Every prompt and decision, on record

Prompts, conversations, tool calls and policy decisions from every source, tied to a person and stored verbatim, redacted or as fingerprints. It all lands next to each person's groups, access and risk, so a policy or a detection can use it the moment it appears.

Control · model hooks 05

Block it before the model sees it.

Start in shadow mode and see what would be blocked, then block for the whole account, a group or one person.

01

Prompt or tool call

On its way to a model.

02

Hook asks SlashID

Before the model runs.

03

Policy and tags decide

On the prompt, the model, the file and the tool.

04

Allow, or block

The person sees the reason.

/ Prompts

Expressions and models

Prompts that contain expressions you define, or that use models you haven't approved, for the account or for specific groups and people.

/ Files

Sensitive uploads

Files tagged sensitive in the graph, matched by their content hash, stopped before the model sees them.

/ MCP tools

Writes and deletes

Tool calls by server and tool, or by what the tool does. SlashID infers whether a call reads, writes or deletes, so one rule stops every write.

Control · intent-aware access 06

Decide on what the prompt is for, and issue tokens to match.

Expressions catch the words. Intent catches the purpose, however the prompt is worded.

/Purpose, not wording

A prompt that asks to export customer data or delete a repository is blocked for what it means, not for the words it uses.

/Access cut to the task

The token issued for the task carries only the access its intent needs, so an agent asked to read cannot write.

/Policy on person and intent

The same intent can be fine for one team and off-limits for another. Policy decides on both the person and what they're trying to do.

/Kept with the decision

Each decision records the inferred intent next to the person and the policy, so a block can be explained and reviewed.

/ Intent decisionmodel hook
"prompt": "summarize churned
           customers"
"intent": read · customer data  ← inferred
"person": "[email protected]"
"policy": "Customer data:
           read for sales"
"token":  "crm.read"            ← cut to task
dana.lee→agent→crm.read only
Control · MCP gateway 07

Corporate sign-in and a decision on every tool call.

Run Gate as a gateway in front of third-party MCP servers, or as a sidecar beside your own servers and agents.

/ MCP decision logenforcing
crm.read_contact alice → support-agent · scope crm.readallow
crm.delete_account alice → support-agent · destructive tooldeny
warehouse.query spiffe://acme.prod/etl-agent · token 5 minallow
claude · messages data-analyst-agent · 92% of monthly budgetalert
1,284 tool calls today12 denied

/Sign in once

A 401 challenge sends the MCP client to your organization's login. Gate accepts only tokens your organization issued to the clients you registered for the server.

/Decide every call

Each tool call is decided on the person's groups, tags and attributes, the tool, the arguments of a single call, and the time of day.

/A reason, not a dead end

A denial comes back as a tool result carrying the policy's reason, and tools a person would certainly be denied are hidden from the list.

/Each person, their own account

In front of vendor MCP servers like GitHub and HubSpot, Gate swaps the person's SlashID token for their vendor token, so the client never holds it. Not connected yet? The model shows a link to connect. Revoked? Access ends within five minutes.

/Hosted by SlashID, or run by you

Add a server in the console and Gate serves it in seconds. Or run it yourself, as a Docker image or a static binary.

/A sidecar with no way around it

No code change: Gate runs next to the MCP server or agent, on the same host or in the same pod. Bind the server to localhost and every call has to come through Gate. Already behind Envoy? Gate can run as its external authorization check instead.

Policies 08

Write a policy once, test it on real traffic.

/ Example ruleGate
Production writes need the SRE group
when · tool is one ofdeploy, delete_record
and · group is notsre
thendeny
// reason"Production writes need the SRE group."

/Rules or Rego

Build rules in the console, and drop to Rego when a rule needs more. Keep them in source control if you prefer.

/Monitor before you enforce

Run a policy in monitor mode and review what it would have blocked before it blocks anything.

/Dry-run on recorded traffic

Replay a draft MCP policy against the traffic Gate recorded, and see what it would allow and deny.

/Live in seconds

Gates pick up a saved policy within seconds, without a restart.

Attribute · on-behalf-of 09

Every hop names the person, and narrows what it can do.

/No borrowed credentials

Every hop authenticates as itself, with a SPIFFE workload identity or an OAuth client. Standards-based token exchange (RFC 8693) keeps the person as the subject and records each agent as an actor.

/Privileges only shrink

Scopes stay a subset, lifetimes only shorten, audiences are allow-listed, and escalation fails closed. Each service's sidecar runs its own policy on what arrives.

/Ends at what you run

A service that trusts only your identity provider gets that provider's token for the same person. Nothing is impersonated, and the provider's conditional access is evaluated every time.

/One audit trail

Every exchange and decision is recorded with the full chain, and joins the identity provider's own sign-in log.

/ Delegated tokenafter two hops
"sub":   "[email protected]"
"scope": "read"          ← was read write
"aud":   "service-2"     ← allow-listed
"exp":   ≤ subject's   ← only shorter
"act": {
  "sub": "service-1"
  "act": {
    "sub": "mcp-server"
  }
}
alice→mcp-server→service-1→service-2
Prove it 10

Every block on record, with the person and the policy.

/ Blocked requestexample
Modelclaude-opus-5-5
PolicySensitive files stay out of AI
MatchedQ3-forecast.xlsx · Finance
Decisionblocked

/Blocked requests, per policy

Each policy lists its latest blocks, linked to the person's activity.

/Detections when it looks wrong

Repeated blocks, sensitive files shared with AI, prompt injection and secrets in prompts.

/Every MCP decision

Gates you run report each decision with the person, the tool and, for a denial, the rule.

/Out to your tools

Detections and events stream to your SIEM, and webhooks start the response in SOAR and ticketing.

Why it wins 11

Inventory tools see it. Gateways block it. SlashID does both.

Capability / SlashID NHI discovery & posture tools Network & LLM gateways
See the AI people bring themselves ● Browser sign-ins, consents & extensions ◐ Sanctioned apps via admin APIs ○ Sees only proxied traffic
Block before the model sees it ● Prompts, sensitive files & tool calls ○ Not available ◐ Prompt filters, no identity context
Decide on intent, issue tokens to match ● Intent inferred, token cut to the task ○ Not available ○ Not available
Per-tool MCP authorization, inline ● Tool, arguments & time; denied tools hidden ◐ Host hooks or partner enforcement ◐ Route or endpoint level
Decisions keyed on directory identity ● People and agents, one graph ◐ Non-human identities only ○ Token or API key only
On-behalf-of delegation chains ● RFC 8693, through to legacy services ○ Not available ○ Not available
An owner for every agent & key ● Orphaned, dormant & never-expiring flagged ● Core strength ○ Out of scope
Policy dry-run on recorded traffic ● See what it would allow and deny ○ Not available ○ Not available
AI spend & token budgets ● Per identity, team or organization ○ Not available ◐ Per API key

● full   ◐ partial   ○ none. Category comparison based on publicly documented capabilities; individual products vary.

Get started 13

Scope an
AI / pilot.

Bring admin access to your AI providers, a pilot group and the AI clients they use, the files you treat as sensitive, and two or three MCP servers. You'll see an inventory of AI use tied to people, policies in monitor mode with a list of what they would have blocked, and your first MCP servers behind corporate sign-in.